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conditions that are so confining as to distort the phenomena
studied and to miss their critical aspects.
A restrictive approach can actually subvert symbolic processes;
for example, it is impossible to study representational ability in
apes without providing a rich ecological, ethological, and symbolic
context of enculturation (Miles 1997; Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin
1994). Researchers may need to act “as if ” as a methodological
requirement in order to determine whether animals have mental
abilities. In fact, rich symbolic and social contexts and rewards may
be crucial for understanding human biosocial and mental develop-
ment (Shore 1996), as well as being a critical component of a
normal rearing history for all hominoids. Social rewards in closely
interactive units are certainly the norm in the development of
socially competent chimpanzees (Goodall 1986).
Most important, to argue that only one method can allow us to
conclude that children or animals do or do not have a theory of
mind leads to other surprisingly narrow-minded analyses. For
example, Heyes questions that the home raised chimpanzee, Viki,
could imitate (Hayes & Hayes 1952) on the grounds that no
method was reported in which the experimenter measured the
degree of similarity of Viki’s behavior. But Heyes fails to note that
this was later provided by a replication of this study with the
enculturated orangutan Chantek (Miles et al. 1996). Heyes also
considers only mirror self-recognition, and ignores other mea-
sures of self-awareness, including personal pronouns and posses-
sion (Itakura 1994; Miles 1994; Patterson & Cohn 1994) as well as
Menzel’s (1974) experiment on chimpanzee deception. Finally,
she ignores that all child studies are linguistically mediated either
by virtue of the procedures used or by the prior enculturation of
the children. Such adherence to a single perspective may hold
some benefits, but overall it is myopic.
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Abstract: Heyes’s literature review of deception, imitation, and self-
recognition is inadequate, misleading, and erroneous. The anaesthetic
artifact hypothesis of self-recognition is unsupported by the data she
herself examines. Her proposed experiment is tantalizing, indicating that
theory of mind is simply a Turing test.
We agree with several of Heyes’s ideas, especially those which
remind us of earlier arguments that self-recognition and bodily
imitation need not imply theory of mind (Mitchell 1993), and that
information about an animal’s history is necessary to interpret its
deceptions (Mitchell 1986; Morgan 1894). Our own research,
replicating Woodruff & Premack’s (1979) chimpanzee study with
capuchin monkeys, supports the idea that communicative and
deceptive pointing can derive from discrimination learning (Mit-
chell & Anderson 1997), though it raises the question of why
macaques failed to learn deceptive pointing in a similar experi-
mental setting (Blaschke & Ettlinger 1987). Perhaps a more
accurate and thorough literature review than the one provided by
Heyes would establish more common ground.
Heyes claims that all instances of imitation in nonhuman pri-
mates “could” or “may” have come about by chance or nonimita-
tive means, even when the same animal produces a variety of
responses supporting a generalized ability for the imitation of
behavior. Instead of evidence, scenarios of possible or spurious
reinforcements for each particular instance are offered. Such
speculations are not evidence against an ability for imitation; even
in humans, imitation develops from nonimitative processes and
generalization of previously learned behaviors (Guillaume
1926/1971). Alternative explanations for single behaviors pro-
duced by rats and budgerigars are ignored, no evidence is pro-
vided that they can imitate a variety of actions, and their imitations
appear unrelated to cross-modal imitations present in humans and
some apes (Mitchell 1996; 1997). Relevant studies on primate
imitation are ignored by Heyes: one experiment explicitly de-
signed to shape imitative responses resulted in failure with a
macaque (Mitchell & Anderson 1993), another in success with an
orangutan (Miles et al. 1996). Contrary to Heyes’s claims, Gallup
(1982) and Povinelli (1987) never discuss imitation as evidence of
theory of mind, and only two (not all four) chimpanzees in
Woodruff & Premack’s (1979) study pointed to an empty container
with the competitor, and those on less than 80% of the last 60–94
trials, after about 190 trials each with competitor and cooperator.
In presenting the self-recognition literature, Heyes ignores
evidence from apes of self-exploration of body-parts not visible
without a mirror, studies using sham marking instead of an-
aesthesia, evidence of self-recognition in gorillas, and meth-
odological flaws in studies of human infants (Parker et al. 1994).
Contrary to her claims, studies using variants of the traditional
mark test procedure do not support her anaesthesia artifact
hypothesis, as these studies used monkeys (which never pass any
form of the mark test) or very young great apes (see Gallup et al.
1995). Given that Heyes’s hypothesis is intended to explain why
chimpanzees pass the mark test, her inclusion of mark-directed
touches by chimpanzees failing the mark test (in the means and
standard deviations for the bimodal distribution created by com-
bining both passing and failing animals) is baffling. For Swartz and
Evans (1991) the one chimpanzee who passed the mark test (on all
3 trials) showed from 10–23 mark touches while looking at herself
in the mirror, and from 1–7 mark touches in the control condition;
for Povinelli et al. (1993), the 10 chimpanzees who passed the
mark test touched the mark on average 11.2 times (s 5 10.8) in the
mirror condition, but only 1.6 times (s 5 2.5) in the control
condition (and including “spurious” mark-rubs does not change
the difference between conditions). By contrast, those chim-
panzees who failed the mark test showed infrequent mark touch-
ing, but more of it in the control condition than in the mirror
condition, indicating that chimpanzees are not, generically, more
likely to touch the mark by chance in the mirror condition than in
the control. For Swartz and Evans, the 10 “failing” chimpanzees
touched the mark infrequently in the mirror condition (21 tests
with no touches, 5 with 1–4 touches), whereas most touched the
mark in the control condition (11 tests with no touches, 15 with 1–
12); for Povinelli et al., 18/20 of these chimpanzees failed to touch
the mark at all in the mirror condition, but 12/20 touched it at least
once (range 1–13) in the control condition (and including “spu-
rious” mark-rubs just increases the latter range). For most chim-
panzees, then, mark-touching frequency actually decreased as the
time interval since anaesthesia increased.
Heyes argues that to detect itself via a mirror, an organism must
distinguish its own bodily inputs from external inputs. The imme-
diate relevance of this internal/external distinction to self-
recognition remains unclear (Anderson & Gallup, in press; Mit-
chell 1996): human children make this distinction by 5 months of
age (Watson 1994), yet do not show any signs of self-recognition
until 10–19 months later. The logical conclusion from Heyes’s
argument is that all visually capable organisms should pass the
mark test, yet they do not. Although she cites Epstein et al.’s (1981)
“self-recognizing” pigeon experiment favorably, it has failed to
replicate despite extensive efforts (Thompson & Contie 1994).
Heyes’s assertion that autistic children show self-recognition at the
same age as normal children is surprising, given that the youngest
autistic children tested are 3-year-olds (Mitchell 1997).
Heyes’s proposed experiments raise some surprising issues
about theory of mind and about how a chimpanzee might interpret
human actions. They presume that laboratory chimpanzees be-
lieve that humans know where objects are located solely through
vision; yet these chimpanzees presumably have numerous experi-
ences in which humans appear to know the location of something
without having seen it. Indeed, in the second (variant) test, the
human who does not observe the baiting or wears opaque goggles
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nevertheless knows enough to point to a container, and sometimes
even to the correct one, which seems confusing. Greater fre-
quency of correct solutions with Knower than with Guesser, or
faster learning with Group Direct than with Group Reverse, do
not seem adequate as evidence of theory of mind unless the
correct solutions occurred from the start of the transfer trials. In
fact, surely only a correct choice on the first transfer trial can count
toward evidence of theory of mind, whether or not chimpanzees
are consistently rewarded: reward would contaminate subsequent
responses, and lack of reward could indicate error and therefore
lead the chimpanzee to respond to other stimuli. Either way,
simple task analysis indicates that the experiment she describes
remains essentially a multiple discrimination learning task, which
even macaques can perform (see Mitchell & Anderson 1997).
Perhaps, in fact, we can never be sure whether an animal is
responding to another based only on the other’s behavior, or on
mental-state inferences from that behavior. As Turing (1950,
p. 446) argued, we may have to maintain the “polite convention
that everyone thinks” until his or her behavior suggests otherwise.
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Abstract: Study of “theory of mind” in nonhuman primates is hampered
both by the lack of rigorous methodology that Heyes stresses and by our
lack of knowledge of the cognitive neuroscience of nonhuman primate
conceptual structure. Recent advances in this field indicate that progress
can be made by first asking simpler research questions.
In the two decades that have elapsed since Premack and Woodruff
(1978) opened the debate about theory of mind in nonhuman
primates (NHPs), a great deal has been learned about the devel-
opment of social intelligence in human infants. Heyes attributes
the contrasting lack of progress in our understanding of NHP
theory of mind to ineffectual experimental methodologies and lack
of clear theorizing. To some extent she may be right. But another
interpretation of the research covered in her target article might
be that, in the present state of knowledge about NHPs, we are
asking the wrong questions, or trying to force comparisons that are
simply inappropriate. This is particularly true as theories of human
theory of mind development have become sophisticated very
quickly.
One recent proposal is that theory of mind development in
human infants depends on the development of “modules” for
intentionality detection, gaze direction detection, and shared
attention, leading to the development of a further theory of mind
module (Baron-Cohen 1995). The importance of linguistic pro-
cessing in this last stage should not be underestimated. A useful
research question would therefore be, To what extent do these
modules, or their precursors, occur in NHPs? Heyes’s proposed
experiment deals with one aspect of visual attention, the inference
of another’s knowledge of an event from a calculation of whether
or not they have perceived it. Her proposed method is likely to
produce valuable insights on this topic. At the present point, we
need precise quantitative knowledge about the range of NHP
conceptual abilities about other minds.
Abilities are likely to be tied to neuroanatomy. So we should also
ask about the extent to which different species of primates have
similar or different neural structures and connections, and to what
extent this leads to similar abilities. Neuroanatomical study of the
frontal lobes of humans and macaque monkeys has revealed that
their basic architectonic plan is the same (Petrides & Pandya
1994). A recent comparison of cytoarchetectonic areas thought to
be uniquely human with chimpanzee and macaque brains, like-
wise suggests that the basic organization of these areas is the same
(Passingham 1997). Moving from anatomy to behavior, we have
found that damage to structures known to be important in episodic
memory in humans causes large deficits in object-in-place mem-
ory in monkeys (Parker & Gaffan 1997a; 1997b). Similarly, damage
to perirhinal cortex will affect the monkey equivalent of semantic
memory – conceptual knowledge about objects. (Parker & Gaffan
1997c). It is unlikely however, that autobiographical memory will
develop without language (Nelson 1993), and it seems likely that
autobiographical, rather than episodic, memory is the key feature
of the human conception of the self and the consequent full
development of complex representations of other minds.
Primates are able to understand the world, including their social
world, because of their highly developed conceptual resources. An
emergent property of the neural structure of the temporal and
frontal lobes is that they store information as categories. In the
temporal lobe, these structures represent objects, while the fron-
tal lobe stores action, intention, and affect related schemata.
Combining these two types of information enables primates to
produce complex and subtle behaviors over a wide range of
situations. At a certain point this conceptual structure may be-
come elaborate enough to sustain a theory of mind. What are its
basic building blocks? This is a more answerable question. One
source of answers may lie in the way that object representations in
the temporal lobe become integrated with appropriate strategies
in the frontal lobe, and the effects of damage to these structures on
this knowledge. Current experiments involve only abstract stimuli
and arbitrary categories (Parker & Gaffan 1997d) and indicate that
when interaction between object knowledge and action strategies
is prevented, behavior is at chance levels. Future research with
this paradigm will examine real categories of objects. It is a short
step from here to the study of how monkeys apply strategies to
categories of conspecifics.
To conclude, much of the available evidence points to language
as being vitally important for the development of a complete
human theory of mind. This does not mean that components of
this ability are not present in NHPs, but it does mean that using
anthropomorphic methods to search for them is inappropriate. We
should be searching for the basic elements of social understanding
in primates, and using rigorous experimental methodologies, as
Heyes suggests.
To see or not to see, that is the question:
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Abstract: Heyes argues that we need alternative experiments to study
those animal abilities generally considered to involve “theory of mind.”
The studies she proposes, however, have as many problems as those that
she criticizes. Further interactions should exist among researchers exam-
ining these capacities before additional experiments are undertaken.
As a researcher who studies cognitive and communicative capaci-
ties of nonhumans (e.g., Pepperberg 1990; 1996), I both agree and
disagree with Heyes’s target article. I agree that questions con-
cerning animal capacities such as self-awareness and perspective-
taking are intriguing, but that much published research into these
areas has either failed to show such abilities or made unfounded
claims for these capacities because of problems in experimental
design. I disagree with some specific criticisms that Heyes has
offered; because many of my colleagues have previously engaged
